Israel Falls for Lebanon’s Treaty Bait-and-Switch

My quip turned out to be prescient. Two years later, the states have reached an agreement on their offshore exclusive economic zone boundary that heavily favors Lebanon. During negotiations, mediated by the Biden administration, Israel conceded the entirety of its claims to the 330-square-mile zone to Lebanon in return for a 3-mile internationally recognized buffer zone adjacent to the shoreline. The remainder of the zone goes to Lebanon, which will also have the right to exploit a natural gas field known as Qana, which extends south of the frontier, and an obligation to remunerate Israel for the extracted gas there.

The contours of the proposed deal are stunning. When I kicked off negotiations in October 2020, Israel was claiming a line running northwest from the border at Naqoura; Lebanon claimed a line running southwest from the same point. The lines outlining this disputed area—resembling a slice of pie roughly 70 nautical miles long, with the crust abutting the end of Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone—are known respectively as the “1” and “23” lines, filed long ago with the United Nations. As per the new agreement, Lebanon will attain virtually 100% of its initial negotiating position.

It’s a remarkable turn of events, especially given Beirut’s profound lack of leverage. The talks took place amid Lebanon’s deepening financial crisis, a man-made disaster that has since seen a more than 95% devaluation in the lira, a 20% decline of gross domestic product, and the impoverishment of 85% of the population. A maritime deal that could potentially generate substantial revenue for a failing state should have created a sense of urgency in Beirut for an agreement.

Despite their weak hand, however, Lebanese negotiators won the day by employing a time-tested bait-and-switch negotiating tactic. Immediately after talks commenced, Lebanon changed its position, demanding an even larger exclusive economic zone. Beirut’s shift further south, to the “29” line, encompassed 550 square miles—a maximalist demand that led to a breakdown in the talks in the waning days of the Trump administration. When negotiations resumed during the Biden administration, the new Israeli government of Prime Minister

Yair Lapid

saw Lebanon’s readiness to return to the 23 line in return for the buffer zone as a significant concession.

Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese terrorist organization, also played an important if indirect role in the talks. The organization has threatened to attack the

Energean

floating production system rig in Israel’s Karish field, south of the 23 line, if the ship started to extract gas prior to reaching an agreement on the maritime border. Before Hezbollah’s warning, Israel announced that pumping would start in September. In the absence of a deal, extraction didn’t commence.

Notwithstanding the concessions, the Lapid government and many in Israel believe the agreement is beneficial. Most important, the Israel Defense Forces say it will de-escalate tensions with Hezbollah. Not only would a maritime settlement remove one point of friction with the group; it would create a mutuality of interests between Lebanon and Israel that might make another war less likely. An agreement would also effectively make Hezbollah and its Lebanese Christian allies—who blessed the deal—Israel’s business partners, breaking a taboo on future engagement.

But the proposition that the maritime deal makes Israel safer or promotes prospects for normalization with yet another Arab State is dubious. An agreement may temporarily lower the temperature along the frontier, but with Iran upgrading its proxy’s arsenal of missiles and Hezbollah digging in along the border, another war appears inevitable. It’s difficult to imagine that Hezbollah won’t emerge from these negotiations emboldened by Israel’s decision to delay extraction, perhaps demonstrating undue flexibility to avoid another conflagration.

The agreement is a mixed bag. The compromises Israel made demonstrate how far it will go to make peace with its Arab neighbors. It is an unprecedented positive step with Lebanon. Unfortunately, as long as Beirut remains a satrapy of Iran and dominated by its proxy, it’s unclear how any agreement—no matter how beneficial to Lebanon—will prevent the next Israel-Hezbollah war.

Mr. Schenker is director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.