Eastern Europe’s Culture War Over Ukraine

As pro-European Union coalition governments increasingly define themselves against populist opposition parties, support for Ukraine has become the defining issue in disputes over national identity. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have been generous in their support for Kyiv, but their political establishments look with disdain at large portions of the local populations that are skeptical about the level of support being provided to Ukraine’s war effort.

Antiwar and antigovernment protesters in the Czech Republic, gathering under a social movement called “Czech Republic First,” are motivated by “hatred,” according to their pro-Ukraine opponents. A Czech protest on Oct. 28 attracted tens of thousands of people who blamed the rising cost of living on support for Ukraine and called for the resignation of the government, with a similar number attending a pro-Ukraine counterdemonstration two days later. Czech Interior Minister

Vít Rakušan

declared that “our foes” won’t be allowed to “steal our patriotism or our flag,” seeming to portray anyone questioning government policy on Ukraine as an enemy of the state.

The governments in Prague and Bratislava are praised for their unhesitating support for Kyiv. The Czech Republic was the first North Atlantic Treaty Organization country to send tanks to the Ukrainian army, and both countries have welcomed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees.

At the same time, these governments have been abject failures in consolidating popular support for Ukraine. They have allowed and even encouraged the war’s transformation into a domestic culture war between city-dwellers and poorer rural voters who are concerned about the impact of the war on the cost of living. The Czech government’s open hostility to protesters fuels the adversarial environment. Prime Minister

Petr Fiala

claimed antiwar protests are evidence of a “Russian fifth column” that is “close to extremist positions.”

Such statements have helped turn the Ukraine war into a bitterly partisan issue entrenching existing social and cultural divides. Those in favor of supporting Kyiv tend to be pro-EU and advocates of progressive values, with the recent pro-Ukraine counterdemonstration in Prague also focused on support for the region’s LGBT community.

Antigovernment protesters tend to be euroskeptics and social conservatives. They’re also remarkably suspicious of the intentions and geopolitical influence of America. At Czech Republic First protests, references to

Vladimir Putin

are few and far between, but banners, placards and speeches denouncing American influence are plentiful.

However much one disagrees with their opinions, labeling these protesters extremists is no way to consolidate support for Ukraine. Serious consideration instead needs to be given to why so many in Eastern Europe feel alienated by establishment politicians and the mainstream media.

These Eastern European governments have been uncompromising in their actions to support Ukraine, and the Czech cabinet visited Kyiv at the end of October for talks with President

Volodymyr Zelensky.

But if these leaders fail to take a more conciliatory tone toward their own people, they may reap a whirlwind of resentment for the strained economic times ahead. After all, it’s much harder for citizens to find fault with a government that protects their own interests than it is for them to criticize regimes that seem to give priority to the interests of others, even when the moral reasons are sound.

This is proved by the reaction to Hungarian Prime Minister

Viktor Orbán’s

unapologetic “Hungary First” stance on the war. Support for this self-centered policy is high even among opposition voters. The number of Hungarians in favor of sanctions on Russia is decreasing, and support for the government’s refusal to send arms to Kyiv extends across traditional political divides.

But in Slovakia, a recent poll suggests that more than 50% of the population now want Russia to emerge victorious from the war, with one-fifth wanting a “clear victory” for the Kremlin. And while it’s commonly assumed that Eastern European support for Russia is a generational issue, the poll found the highest proportion of people wanting a Russian victory in the 30-39 age group.

It’s usual for researchers to claim a correlation between education and support for Ukraine, playing into stereotypes of antiwar demonstrators as unenlightened rural folk motivated by narrow self-interest. This dubious characterization is dangerous for governments keen to keep up their support for Kyiv. Shutting down debate by dismissing opposing voices as stupid, selfish or extremist is the surest path to boosting a groundswell of opposition to support for Ukraine.

Mr. Nattrass is a British journalist and commentator based in Prague.