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Tim Harford writing at the FT covers the question “Is it even possible to prepare for a pandemic?” drawing on my paper with Tucker Omberg.
[I]n an unsettling study published late last year, the economists Robert Tucker Omberg and Alex Tabarrok took a more sophisticated look at this question and found that “almost no form of pandemic preparedness helped to ameliorate or shorten the pandemic”. This was true whether one looked at indicators of medical preparedness, or softer cultural factors such as levels of individualism or trust. Some countries responded much more effectively than others, of course — but there was no foretelling which ones would rise to the challenge by looking at indicators published in 2019. One response to this counter-intuitive finding is that the GHS Index doesn’t do a good job of measuring preparedness. Yet it seemed plausible at the time and it still looks reasonable now.
…perhaps we need to take the Omberg/Tabarrok study seriously: maybe conventional preparations really won’t help much. What follows? One conclusion is that we should prepare, but in a different way….Preparing a nimble system of testing and of compensating self-isolating people would not have figured in many 2019 pandemic plans. It will now. Another form of preparation which might yet pay off is sewage monitoring, which can cost-effectively spot the resurgence of old pathogens and the appearance of new ones, and may give enough warning to stop some future pandemics before they start. And, says Tabarrok, “Vaccines, vaccines, vaccines”. The faster our systems for making, testing and producing vaccines, the better our chances; all these things can be prepared.
One thing that did seem to matter, as Tim notes, was state capacity. In other words, it’s not so much being prepared as being prepared to act. And here I have a mild disagreement with Tim. He writes:
In an ill-prepared world, the UK is often thought to have been more ill-prepared than most, perhaps because of the strains caused by austerity and the distractions of the Brexit process.
My view is that the UK got three very important things right. The UK was the first stringent authority to approve a COVID vaccine. The UK switched to first doses first and the UK produced and ran the most important therapeutics trial, the Recovery trial. Each of these decisions and programs saved the lives of tens of thousands of Britons. The Recovery trial may have saved millions of lives worldwide.
I don’t claim that Britain did everything right, or that they did all that they could have done, but these three decisions were important, bold and correct. The coexistence of both high and low state capacity within the same nation can be surprising. The United States, for example, achieved an impressive feat with Operation Warp Speed, yet simultaneously, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) flailed and failed. Likewise, India maintains a commendable space program and an efficient electoral system, even while struggling with tasks that seem comparatively simpler, like issuing driver’s licenses.
Instead of painting countries with a broad brush of ‘high’ or ‘low’ state capacity, we should recognize multi-dimensionality and divergence. How do political will, resources, institutional robustness, culture, and history explain capacity divergence? If we understood the reasons for capacity divergence we might be able to improve state capacity more generally. Or we might better be able to assign tasks to state or market with perhaps very different assignments depending on the country.
The post Does Britain Have High or Low State Capacity? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
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