Jair Bolsonaro Delivers Another Right-Wing Populist Surprise

The surprise extended well beyond the president. Mr. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party won 99 seats in the lower house of Brazil’s National Congress, up from 77 seats. Together with other right-leaning parties, the pro-Bolsonaro forces now control half the chamber. In the Senate, Mr. Bolsonaro’s allies won nearly half of the seats at stake. Candidates from the Liberal Party and its allies won the governorships of eight of Brazil’s 26 states in the first round and are positioned to win as many as eight more in the runoff. Whatever happens to Mr. Bolsonaro in the presidential runoff, “Bolsonarism” has become firmly entrenched in Brazilian politics and will make it harder for Mr. da Silva to govern effectively if he wins the presidency.

There are sound reasons why this result seemed improbable to many. After calling Covid-19 “a little flu,” Mr. Bolsonaro presided over the deaths of more than 680,000 of his fellow citizens, second only to the U.S. in the official count. He encouraged massive deforestation in the Amazon and failed to end the long economic stagnation that has left the average Brazilian 10% poorer than a decade ago. What explains his success?

Brazilians had grown weary of widespread political corruption under socialist rule, a crime for which Mr. da Silva was sent to prison after his presidency ended. (His conviction was overturned on procedural grounds after he had served 19 months.) Mr. Bolsonaro’s campaign in 2018 against elite corruption hit a nerve in the electorate.

But deeper trends have been at work. As Latin America expert

Brian Winter

has noted, over the past four decades, evangelical Christianity in Brazil has tripled, from 10% of the population to as much as one-third today. This surge has reinforced the social conservatism of Brazil’s voters, 70% of whom oppose legalizing abortion and drugs and many of whom favor traditional sex roles and religious instruction in schools.

In addition to social conservatism, Mr. Bolsonaro has benefited from economic policies that have strengthened his support in small towns and rural areas. Most Brazilians favor the agribusiness boom that the unchecked exploitation of the Amazon region has enabled, and, in a classic populist move, the government disbursed direct payments to working-class and poor voters as the election neared.

Mirroring the pattern set by former President Trump, Mr. Bolsonaro gained strength from the attacks against him. His supporters admire his critique of political correctness and his unflinching defense of policies that Brazilian elites scorn.

What explains the failure of polls to predict the level of support for Mr. Bolsonaro? Technical factors explain part of the gap. Because Brazil’s census has been delayed, no one knows for sure how Brazil’s demography has changed over the past decade. Pollsters seem to have overestimated the number of poor people, most of whom support Mr. da Silva, and underestimated the number of evangelical Christians, most of whom support the incumbent.

What pollsters call “social desirability bias” probably deterred some social conservatives from revealing their preferences to people administering the surveys. And citizens who mistrust official institutions were probably the least inclined to answer pollsters’ questions at all.

These polling problems aren’t confined to Brazil. In 2016 they helped explain the defeat of the Remainers in the Brexit vote—and Donald Trump’s stunning victory over

Hillary Clinton.

In 2020 they turned an anticipated Biden sweep into a narrow Biden victory that a shift of a little more than 40,000 votes in three states would have reversed.

The immediate question is whether the same forces will be at work when populist leaders aren’t on the ballot. Mr. Trump inserted himself forcefully into the 2022 Republican primaries, and his endorsement was decisive for at least three Senate candidates who are now locked in close general-election contests. If

Mehmet Oz,

Herschel Walker,

and

Blake Masters

prevail despite trailing in the polls, it will be further proof that pollsters’ tendency to underestimate support for populist conservatives extends beyond national leaders.

If these candidates lose, however, it will be Mr. Trump who will have some explaining to do.